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“My Body Remembered”:  




In this thesis, I seek to characterize the experience of insight in incidences of individuals 
remembering and recognizing “bodily memories” of traumatic events. These cases, identified 
through published narratives (see Appendix A for a selection of excerpts I will refer to 
throughout), focus on individuals who assert that “their body remembered” or “their body 
knowing before they did.” In addition to ascribing such thought-provoking descriptions, these 
individuals also describe an “aha!” (or “uh-oh”) moment, also known as insight. Altogether, I am 
examining phenomenology of two, apparently linked, experiences: the experience of insight, and 
the experience of reporting something called bodily memory. 
 I argue that the key to understanding these phenomena lies in the discussion of 
consciousness. Specifically, I present a conception of consciousness that emphasizes the ability 
of a state to serve as the basis for action and as a premise in reasoning. I then connect this to 
introspection and the role that introspection plays in our mental lives. Ultimately, I argue that the 
ability of a state to be capable of guiding action but to be not introspectable underwrites the 
phenomena of bodily memory and the experience of insight about thereof.  
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I. Introduction 
In this section, I will provide an overview of the current taxonomy of memory as set forth 
by psychologists, neuroscientists, and philosophers. I will then discuss some of the more 
contentious cases, as developed by Mark Rowlands, and argue that the discourse on 
consciousness may prove illuminating. I will also introduce the narratives that I will cite 
throughout this thesis as examples of bodily memories, and discuss one essential feature to them, 
namely the experience of insight. Finally, I will connect the discussion of memory, 
consciousness, bodily memory, and insight to motivate the question that I seek to answer: what 
does it mean to have an insight experience wherein one reports a bodily memory? 
Beginning with the discussion of memory, there are many different types of memory and 
divisions thereof. The first distinction proposed by psychologists is sensory memory (<1 
second), short-term memory (<1 minute), and long-term memory. Indubitably, each is 
philosophically interesting, not to mention scientifically valuable. Sensory memory and short-
term memory may help inform epistemology and philosophy of mind. Nonetheless, my interest 
is primarily on long-term memory. Long-term memory and knowledge help serve as the basis of 
our beliefs about ourselves and our lives, as well as guide our future actions and decisions. Some 
philosophers, such as John Locke, even go so far as to suggest that part of what it means to be 
the same person (in the sense that I am the same person today as I was when I was ten) is 
continuity/inheritance of our memories.1  
Not all memories are positive memories, however. Memories of trauma have attracted 
attention from cognitive scientists, physicians, psychologists, and philosophers alike for the 
often-unusual (and both adaptive and maladaptive) ways that they are processed and operate 
 
1 Michaelian and Sutton, “Memory.” 
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within our mental lives. Freud identifies cases of “neuroses” where an unconscious state 
representing trauma exert unexpected effects, such as paralysis with no neurological etiology.2 
As a result of this, research is underway regarding what the similarities and differences are 
between our quotidian memory systems and how we remember trauma, and what each informs 
about our understanding of our mental lives. 
Generally, there is a standard taxonomy for long-term memory. It is first divided into 
procedural memory and declarative memory; the former is memory of skills and tasks (i.e. how 
to hold a pen) and the latter is memory of facts and events. This distinction is not a perfect one. 
Consider the case of me skiing: I used to be a regular skier, so I have some degree of muscle 
memory and implicit knowledge of how to ski; however, I have not skied in years, thus I have to 
also remember “Oh, I am supposed to tilt my skis in this manner to go through these moguls.” I 
mention this as to show that, though the standard taxonomy provides significant clarity and is 
fairly widely accepted, there are many intermediate cases even at the first division, and there 
likely will continue to be intermediate cases as we progress throughout the taxonomy. 
This paper will primarily focus on declarative memory. It is true that our procedural 
memories are part of the set of memories that help “make us who we are”; my memory of how to 
swim breaststroke is part of what it is to be me. Nonetheless, I will be primarily focusing on 
declarative memory, as it is generally this type of memory that we act on, report on, and perform 
all sorts of rational actions on the basis of. In other words, because my interest primarily lies in 
how memory factor into our rational (mental) lives, I will be turning to declarative memory. 
Declarative memory, too, can be divided into two subtypes. The first subtype is semantic 
memory, which is considered to be memory of facts. The second subtype is episodic memory, 
 
2 Freud, “Part III. General Theory of the Neuroses.” 
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which is memory of events or experiences. The two can co-occur: I remember that the peregrine 
falcon is the fastest member of the animal kingdom (semantic memory), and I remember myself 
sitting on the train to New York City reading an article about falcons when I found this out 
(episodic memory). Sometimes, memories that are originally episodic can degenerate into 
semantic memories,3 though the inverse does not appear to be possible. For example, shortly 
after I swam my fastest race in senior year, I remembered swimming the race as an episodic 
memory. Since then, I have lost the “episodicity”; now I merely remember it as a fact (“I swam a 
33.24 50m breaststroke my senior year of high school.”) Rowlands argues that this is mediated 
by the “Presence of Self in Memory” (“PSM”) which is necessary and sufficient for a memory to 
be episodic, and when lost, renders a previously episodic memory now semantic.4 PSM is the 
property of a memory such that it is remembered “as something that you have experienced.”  
Rowlands then uses his conception of episodic memories, and memory more generally, to argue 
for the existence of what he calls “Rilkean memories,” a type of bodily memory. It is to bodily 
memories, more generally, that I will now turn. The framework of types of memory as I have 
presented it (short- vs. long-term, declarative vs. procedural, semantic vs. episodic) characterizes 
the memories that we typically think of when we say “memory,” but provides little clarity about 
bodily memories. However, it’s not immediately clear what it means to have a bodily memory. 
As mentioned earlier, Rowlands develops his own theory of bodily memories (Rilkean 
memories) that are contentless memories that arise by “transforming” the “act” of remembering 
following the forgetting of the content of the memory.5 Freud proposes a theory of memory in 
which there are unconscious states that result in bodily manifestations and might be considered 
 
3 Rowlands, Memory and the Self. 
4 Rowlands. 
5 Rowlands, “Rilkean Memory.” 
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bodily memories.6 There is, to my knowledge, no clear consensus on what it means to have a 
bodily memory. Thus, it is my hope in this thesis to help clarify what it amounts to when we say 
someone “has/had a bodily memory.”  
I intend to do so by turning to the discussion of consciousness. Generally, procedural 
memory is considered a type of implicit memory and unconscious, whereas declarative memory 
is considered explicit and conscious. One unique feature of bodily memories is that their content 
is declarative in nature (specifically, in the samples presented, episodic7) but the memory is 
“unconscious” (on our naïve understanding of unconsciousness). For this reason, I argue that the 
discussion of consciousness may inform our understanding of bodily memory.  
In this thesis, I will cite three narratives in which individuals report bodily memory. 
These narratives were found online by searching the key phrases “bodily memory” and “my 
body knew.” The first was published in a peer-reviewed journal with the intent of engendering 
new policies against predatory behavior in youth athletics. The second was published through the 
national #MeToo movement to enrich the discussion by providing additional experiences. The 
third was published on a website for mothers and served as a testimony for grief and for faith. 
These narratives serve as real-life examples of bodily memory. If we seek to understand what it 
means to have a bodily memory, I argue that the best play to turn is to individuals who ascribe it 
to themselves and determine if there is some commonality that explains why each deploys this 
concept, and if that commonality is elucidating about bodily memory itself. In this thesis, I will 
argue there are genuine commonalities that furnish a better understanding of what people are 
referring to when they report “bodily memory.” 
Interestingly, two of the three narratives report an experience of insight. Insight is often 
 
6 Freud, “Part III. General Theory of the Neuroses.” 
7 For discussion of what role episodic memories, in particular, play in bodily memory, see Appendix B. 
 Kramer 6 
described as the “aha!” or “uh-oh” moment. These can occur in problem solving settings (e.g. the 
Random Association Test, in which three words are presented and one must find a fourth word 
that unifies them) or in more quotidian settings (e.g. I go to the supermarket, can tell that I’m 
forgetting an ingredient to buy, then suddenly realize what it is). One of the particularly 
interesting components of the experiences of insight articulated in the narratives is that they are 
not cases of re-examining a problem, “thinking outside the box” to discern a solution, or 
recombining previously unrelated components, as often is the case for examples of insight. 
Rather, the narrators suddenly are able to remember something that previously was not (at least 
prima facie) consciously accessible: the content of the bodily memories. Thus, the insight 
experiences in the narratives seem to be linked, in some capacity, to the narrator’s bodily 
memories. It is not immediately clear if there is a causative link, or whether there is an 
independent factor that binds both; nonetheless, it seems that each is important in understanding 
the other in the narratives. Also interesting is that the product of the insight is, in many ways, 
explanatory. The narrators identify a cause of their experiences or a factor guiding their action; 
the memory of the trauma helps explain many otherwise disparate factors (e.g. mental states, 
sensations, actions). This added feature of the insight experience will, I argue, prove to be the 
link between the bodily memory and the insight experience. 
Ultimately, my thesis hopes to answer the question: What does it mean to have a bodily 
memory, and for it to engender an experience of insight? I argue that discussion of consciousness 
will help characterize this phenomenon. A first pass at elucidating the concept of consciousness 
produces a conscious versus unconscious paradigm; ultimately, though I will argue this is 
inadequate in explaining the phenomenon of interest. Ned Block argues for a distinction between 
Access- and Phenomenal-consciousness, with the former being identified as the type of 
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consciousness involved in guiding rational action. I will argue that it misses an essential feature, 
which is introspectability, and this is in fact what drives the aforementioned phenomenon.  
*** 
I want to make a brief but important point before proceeding. In this thesis, I discuss 
extensively Block’s theory of consciousness. I do so because this framework allows me to 
present these narrators’ thoughts and actions as rational, which I take to be an ethically important 
feature of my project. Block’s account also emphasizes features, namely a state’s rationalizing 
functions and subjective features, in a way that I find persuasive regarding a successful 
conception of consciousness. Finally, though it is by no means uncontroversial, Block’s 
conception of A- and P-consciousness is regarded as promising and has many proponents. I 
believe this shows that this phenomenon and the states underlying it, as I describe them, can exist 
within a broader, established conception of consciousness. (In other words, my argument does 
not wholly break with tradition.) 
That said, I acknowledge that not all readers endorse Block’s conception of 
consciousness. I do not seek to persuade them overwise. Perhaps one instead chooses to endorse 
the transitive versus intransitive consciousness paradigm, or another conception altogether. 
Essentially, though, I do not believe this invalidates my argument or goal. It might be the case 
that we disagree on the nomenclature of the states in these narratives; I will eventually call then 
non-introspectable A-conscious states, but perhaps one might call them unconscious arational 
states or transitively conscious semi-rational states. The label depends on one’s conception of 
consciousness and rationality. Nonetheless, even if we disagree on nomenclature, I believe my 
project succeeds if we agree on the label’s content—if we agree that there is a distinct type of 
state that underlies this phenomenon of bodily memory and insight in survivors of trauma. 
 Kramer 8 
II. Consciousness and Memory 
Earlier, I motivated the question: What does it mean to have an experience of insight 
wherein one reports a bodily memory? I argued that consciousness is a key component to 
answering this question; thus, I will now appraise one of the narratives as it relates to 
consciousness/unconsciousness in order to better understand the role of consciousness in the 
phenomenon of interest.  
It is, generally speaking, well-accepted that there is such thing as unconscious memory, at 
least on the naïve understanding of the unconscious. Many are benign—delightful, even. (For 
example, my very positive childhood memory of an ice cream shop in Cape Cod, which I had not 
been able to consciously access until my family showed me a photo of it, whereupon I suddenly 
remembered the sights and smells.) Some unconscious memories are far more unpleasant. Freud 
and Breuer, notably, argued for a concept they termed “repression.” As they construed it, 
repression occurs when the “intolerable idea is forced out of the self’s consciousness.”8 Certain 
thoughts, beliefs, and memories are simply too painful to include in the conscious sphere; thus, 
they are excluded.  
 It is worth noting that the delineation between “conscious” and “unconscious” is not a 
particularly clear one. In fact, there is ongoing discussion about the concept of consciousness 
itself: Is it one thing, or many? Might it be a cluster concept? Or are those separate things 
different enough to warrant conceptual distinction?9 These refinements later will prove to be 
illuminating. However, we will begin by examining the phenomenon described in the above 
narratives using the naïve understanding of consciousness. 
 
8 Freud and Breuer, Studies in Hysteria. 
9 Block, Flanagan, and Guzeldere, The Nature of Consciousness. 
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 Consider the following narrative, Excerpt Two, which describes a woman interacting 
with a man who had sexually assaulted her. She loosely recalls the event itself (she was 
inebriated when it occurred) but is not conscious of the fact that it constitutes anything 
objectionable, much less illegal. Yet, when she encountered him later, she reacts as if she is 
conscious of that fact: 
I hardly knew him, and hadn’t spoken three sentences to him before he [raped 
me]. A few weeks later, I saw him at a basketball game, and he tried to joke 
around with me and lightly, maybe even kindly, put his hand on my arm. I 
shocked him, and myself, when I quickly pulled my arm away, looked him 
straight in the eye, and said, “Don’t you ever touch me again.” My body knew, 
way before my mind or heart did.10 
 
In Excerpt Two, the narrator expresses surprise at her reaction; to her, it is unexpected and even 
(at the time) seemingly undeserved. On what basis did she act the way she did? I argue that she 
acted on the basis of the knowledge that he violated her. Either the narrator acted irrationally, or 
she acted rationally (or somewhere in between). I am inclined to say she did act rationally—we 
know he did, in fact, violate her, and ethical factors (such as supporting survivors of sexual 
violence) compel me to assume rationality unless given reason otherwise. If she did act 
rationally, she must have acted on the basis of something; there must be some reason for which 
she acted. What is this reason? The only reason, that is available to us in this narrative, that could 
rationalize her behavior is the knowledge of his violation of her. Thus, if we seek to affirm that 
the narrator’s action as rational (insofar as it was guided by reasons), then we find that we must 
endorse the narrator’s knowledge of her assault. 
 Yet, the narrator herself says that “[her] body knew, way before [her] mind.” The narrator 
was “shocked” by her actions. While her action is rationalized by her knowledge of her assault, 
the knowledge of the assault is not conscious. If it were conscious, it would not shock her, and 
 
10 “Yellin ‘Me Too.’” 
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she would not explicitly identify that her body (or something other than her introspectable mental 
facilities) knew before her mind did. So, where does this leave us? On this conceptualization of 
consciousness, the narrator acted on the basis of unconscious knowledge. 
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III. The Unconscious and Action 
 The view that one (in this case, the narrator) may act on the basis of unconscious states 
has some merit. Some authors, such as Freud and Breuer, argue for this analysis.11 Nonetheless, I 
argue that this view of consciousness and unconsciousness misses what I take to be an important 
feature of consciousness and produces falsely equivalent unconscious states. 
 When discussing consciousness, we often say a person is conscious of a certain thing or 
state. Some have likened this usage of “X is conscious of Y” to “X is aware of Y.” When one is 
aware of a thing or state, they can report on it, act on it, use it as a premise in deliberation, and, 
more generally, perform rationally-assessable actions on the basis of it. These actions, at least 
intuitively, seem to belong to the conscious sphere of our mental lives. Yet, in the above 
analysis, the narrator is acting and reasoning on the basis of an unconscious state. Under the 
aforementioned conceptualization rationally-assessable action on the basis of a state, it would be 
conceptually impossible to rationally act on the basis of an unconscious state. That which guides 
action is necessarily conscious in virtue of its actionability—to label that state as unconscious is 
incorrect, then. 
 This reasoning leaves us with the following question: Is something conscious in virtue of 
one’s ability to perform rationally-assessable actions on the basis of it, or can unconscious states 
serve as the basis for performing rationally-assessable actions too? I seek to endorse the former. 
If we endorse the latter,12 what does consciousness amount to other than the 
phenomenal/experiential aspect? What is specifically special about consciousness? It seems 
undesirable to say that consciousness is merely qualia; consciousness seems to do work in 
rational action as well. If rational action can be guided by both consciousness and 
 
11 Freud and Breuer, Studies in Hysteria. 
12 Meaning that both conscious and unconscious states factor into rational action. 
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unconsciousness, then it seems that the role and significance of consciousness is markedly 
reduced. 
 I do not take this to be a knockdown argument; there continue to be reasons to endorse 
the idea that unconscious states may guide rational action. As I will later discuss, though, there 
are some authors who take actionability to be so central a role of consciousness that they take it 
to be something in virtue of which a state is conscious.  
 Above, I discuss what the view that unconscious states may serve as the basis of rational 
action says about consciousness. What does this view say about the unconscious? I argue that 
unconsciousness is construed too broadly; unconsciousness states, on this view, are too 
heterogeneous to belong to a singular concept. Consider the following two states:  
1. I have an unconscious fear of drowning, which, unbeknownst to me, factors 
into my hesitance in booking a beach weekend with my friends. 
2. I have an unconscious fear I will be a bad father someday, upon which I do 
not act. 
 
I argue there is something different about the two states at this time. State 1 guides action and 
engages in rational deliberation that is not introspectable. State 2 does not guide action; it merely 
lies latent in my unconscious. Thus, there are states that are “truly unconscious” in the naïve 
sense (that is to say, the states are present but not introspectable, not actionable, and there are no 
qualia overtly associated with them) and there are states that are unconscious but capable of 
guiding action and may even be associated with qualia. The latter of the two seems to possess 
qualities we generally associate with consciousness, and yet the two are both considered 
unconscious on this view. 
 Perhaps one solution is to divide unconsciousness into two categories: unconsciousness 
that guides rational action and unconsciousness that does not. Interestingly, the former 
category—unconscious states that may guide action and operate in rational processes—is very 
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similar to another conception of consciousness, proposed by Ned Block. Block identifies the 
same idea, namely that there is a component of our mental life beyond the 
experiential/phenomenal component, and this other component is the ability of a state to operate 
as a premise for rational action or inference.13 Critically, though, Block identifies this capacity as 




13 Block, “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness.” 
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IV. Refinements of Consciousness: A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness  
 Earlier, I argued that the conscious/unconscious distinction is insufficient to account for 
the different features of memory and awareness thereof articulated in the narratives. I argued that 
there is a special category of states where they guide action but are not reportable (or are not 
introspectable) that the conscious/unconscious paradigm fails to describe well. Thus, I will now 
to turn to Ned Block’s conceptualization of consciousness which, I argue, does justice to that 
category and perhaps will allow for better understanding of the narratives. 
Block proposes that consciousness is a “mongrel concept.” There is no such thing as a 
singular “consciousness”; rather, consciousness comprises two concepts. The first type of 
consciousness is phenomenal consciousness (“P-consciousness”) which is the experiential 
component of consciousness. P-consciousness is where the phenomenal character of 
consciousness originates. The second type of consciousness, according to Block, is access 
consciousness (“A-consciousness”). A state is A-conscious if it guides action, speech, and/or (a 
state need not fulfill all three) serve as a premise in reasoning. A-consciousness is not an intrinsic 
property of a given state, but rather a feature of a state at a given moment in time; Block uses the 
example of a car, which may or may not be accessible depending on whether his wife is using it 
or not.14 Typically, states that are A-conscious have corresponding P-conscious states. Consider 
a quotidian example: I brew a cup of coffee. I am A-conscious of the knowledge that it is hot, 
which serves a premise in my reasoning cumulating in my belief that I should not immediately 
drink it. I am A-conscious of my desire for the coffee, which directs me to pick it up and begin 
drinking it as soon as I can. P-conscious states include my relaxation and pleasure in smelling the 
scent of freshly brewed coffee and the pain from drinking it while it is too hot. Some states, such 
 
14 Block. 
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as pain, are both A- and P-conscious. Pain certainly guides action—if I am pain because the 
coffee is too hot, I will certainly not take another sip—but there is something to pain over-and-
above its action-directing features. There is a distinct phenomenal component to pain; there 
something it is like to be in pain.15 
 I argue that the states that Block labels as A-conscious are also the states which the 
earlier, Freudian-inspired view, refer to as unconscious states that can guide rational action and 
deliberation. Block acknowledges that the status of A-consciousness as consciousness is not 
universally accepted, and certainly not intuitive.16 Perhaps it is, perhaps it is not. There is 
extensive philosophical and neuroscientific discussion about what constitutes/underwrites 
consciousness as opposed to unconsciousness.17 This is indubitably an important conversation; 
however, I believe it is beyond the scope of this paper. In fact, in this paper, I believe not much 
rests on whether or not A-consciousness is consciousness, unconsciousness, or something in-
between, should such a “space” exist. Rather, what I take to be important is that there is a 
category of mental states that fulfill the requirements of A-consciousness as Block presents them. 
As I am adopting Block’s criteria for admission into A-consciousness, I will also adopt his 
nomenclature.18 
 Now that we have refined previous consciousness-unconsciousness paradigm, we will 
now re-examine Excerpt Two to determine whether or not additional clarity is provided. 
Excerpt Two describes an incident in which the narrator reacts in a way that is justified by 
knowledge of her violation upon which she cannot report at that time. As I argued earlier, while 
 
15 Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” 
16 Block, “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness.” 
17 Block, Flanagan, and Guzeldere, The Nature of Consciousness. 
18 I mention this as to specify that, though I will be using the phrasing “A-consciousness,” I am not taking a stance 
on whether “A-consciousness” is conscious or unconscious, should such a distinction exist. 
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she cannot report or introspect on the knowledge at that time, it seems that she nonetheless acts 
on the basis of it. Because the knowledge of her assault qua assault guides her action, it is A-
conscious.  
 Yet, there is still something apparently missing to the narrator such that she identifies her 
states at that time as her body knowing even while her mind did not. I argue that what is so 
curious about the narrator’s experience with this knowledge—this knowledge that is A-conscious 
insofar as she is acting upon it—is that it is not introspectable. There are many factors that are 
not introspectable that shape our decision-making. For example, consider the phenomenon of 
emotional eating. Certainly, stress subliminally influences me to go snack in a way that may not 
be introspectable, but it is not the basis upon which I act. Rather, it is the fact that I have some 
desire for pretzels, which is A-conscious (I act on the basis of it), and this is introspectable. It 
seems uncommon and unintuitive that there are states that are not merely factors in our actions, 
but instead the reasons for which we act, and are wholly unavailable to introspection. The A-
conscious state’s ability to be introspected upon (“introspectability”), I argue, is the component 
that is “missing” in Excerpt Two. When there is a state that is A-conscious but not 
introspectable, one has the unusual experience of acting on the basis and reasoning based on 
information that they cannot introspect on. This, I argue, conforms with the narrator’s experience 
in Excerpt Two and raises the following question: What is the role of introspectability in 
consciousness and in the narratives? 
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V. Applying the ni/iA-consciousness distinction  
Previous discussion of Block’s conceptualization of consciousness and the narratives 
indicated that introspectability may play a role. Thus, I will now discuss how introspection 
relates to consciousness (as construed by Block) and what work it might do in the narratives.  
Examination of A-consciousness in Excerpt Two pointed to an important distinction 
between states that were introspectable and states that were not, especially with respect to states 
that are A-conscious but not introspectable. Introspectability, more generally, might be a 
component (or product, or feature) of P-consciousness, insofar as there is “something it is like” 
to introspect and that it might arise by examining the “Executive System” which is related to P-
consciousness.19 However, introspectability might also be a component of A-consciousness, as it 
relates to individual states rather than overall experience and is a relation between the state and 
the Executive System. Ultimately, not much rests on whether or not introspectability is part of P-
consciousness or A-consciousness or both, or whether introspectability is some other feature of 
our mental life altogether. Rather, what is important is that there are some states that appear to be 
introspectable, and some states that are not introspectable. Whether this is due to some feature 
“introspectability” that is either present or absent in the state’s encoding or that there are other 
features that render it “introspectable” or “not introspectable” when in the Executive System, it is 
the case that there is something about a given state that makes it introspectable or not 
introspectable. 
Thus, we are left with the following paradigm of consciousness. There are states that, 
whether intrinsically or instrumentally, are able to either be introspected upon or unable to be 
introspected upon. When these states guide action or factor into reasoning as a premise, as in the 
 
19 Block, “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness.” 
 Kramer 18 
narratives, these states are A-conscious. Looking in the narratives, there are two types of A-
conscious states: introspectable A-conscious states (“iA-conscious states”) and non-
introspectable A-conscious states (“niA-conscious states”). This is the distinction that was 
established in order to identify the unique features of the epistemic profiles of the narrators, and 
thus these narratives will be read again through the lens of the i/niA-consciousness distinction. 
In this section, I will argue that the i/niA-consciousness distinction underlies the 
“peculiarity” of these states. Later, I will also argue that a state’s shifting from niA-conscious to 
iA-conscious is what constitutes the insight experience the narrators undergo, and that this 
distinction explains the language (namely, the phrasing that the body remembered or the body 
knew) the narrators use. 
Excerpt Two served as the initial example of an instance in which introspectability plays 
a role in how an A-conscious state factors into an individual’s experience, and thus that is the 
excerpt I will re-examine first. Excerpt Two describes a woman’s experience with a man who 
sexually assaulted her while she was under the influence of alcohol and then later interacting 
with her a football game: 
…he tried to joke around with me and lightly, maybe even kindly, put his hand on 
my arm. I shocked him, and myself, when I quickly pulled my arm away, looked 
him straight in the eye, and said, “Don’t you ever touch me again.” My body 
knew, way before my mind or heart did.20 
 
As I argued earlier, in this narrative, the narrator acts by pulling her arm away and threatening 
her assaulter. This action is justified by the knowledge that he previously assaulted her.21 It is 
very reasonable to think that, of all the possible factors that could guide her action, it was this 
 
20 “Yellin ‘Me Too.’” 
21 In this narrative, the narrator does, in fact, remember the incident itself. It is not that the memory of the assault is 
altogether un-introspectable, but rather the knowledge that the incident constituted assault is un-introspectable. The 
memory exists, but the knowledge of the assault and violation she feels is not introspectable. 
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knowledge of her assault. Thus, the knowledge is A-conscious. Yet, she is unable to introspect 
on that knowledge. It is for this reason that she “shocks… [her]self” – the knowledge is not 
accessible to her to cite as a reason for her actions. Thus, in this narrative, there is an example of 
an niA-conscious state; the knowledge of the narrator’s trauma guides her actions, but she is 
unable to introspect on it.  
 
VI. ni/iA-consciousness and Insight 
 I will now analyze the narratives through the lens of iA-consciousness vs niA-
consciousness and argue that it successfully explains the narrators’ experiences and states. I will 
argue that the memory of the trauma being niA-consciousness obtains—and, in fact, is a driving 
force—in each of the narratives. In this section, I seek to show that the status of the memory as 
niA-conscious allows us to understand why the narrators acted the way they did, and explain the 
insight experience as the narrators report. 
In Excerpt One, a victim of childhood sexual abuse comes to remember the grooming 
she experienced from her sports coach. The narrator begins by describing her thought process 
listening to a fellow survivor who had a similar experience with the same man. She says, “I 
could not help but question why he had never crossed the line with me.”22 In this, she reveals that 
not only does she not know that he did, in fact, cross the line with her, but that she actually 
believes the opposite.23 It is irrational, and perhaps even psychologically impossible, for one to 
be able to introspect on p while also believing ¬p. Nishiten Shah argues that deliberating about 
 
22 Prewitt-White, “I Was His Litmus Test.” 
23 I take this to be intuitive. If I believe p occurred, I would not ask “why did p not occur?” The question itself 
contains an implicit assertion (that p did not occur). The structure of “why” questions is such that they inquire 
further about something they take to be true. Thus, I believe the aforementioned inference (that the narrator asking 
“why he had never crossed the line with [her]” implies the narrator believes “he had never crossed the line with 
[her]”) is reasonable.  
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whether or not to believe p necessarily leads us to deliberate whether or not p is true.24 As it 
relates to this narrative, deliberation about whether or not one believes they experienced p 
requires they deliberate about whether or not it is the case they experienced p, and to do so, they 
examine their memories and other relevant evidence. To believe one did not experience p 
requires they do not have “access” (via introspection) to the memories that would make clear that 
they did, in fact, experience p.25 In other words, because the narrator expresses that she believes 
she was not a victim of abuse, then she must not be able to introspect on the memories and 
knowledge that support the idea that she was a victim of abuse. In sum, any memories pertaining 
to her abuse are not introspectable. 
 While these memories are not introspectable, the narrator acts on the basis of them and 
thus the memories are A-consciousness. The narrator describes her mental states as follows: “I 
always knew there was something tasteless and unsuitable about Coach; following my high 
school playing years I had strong opinions that he was ill-equipped to coach females. Others 
silenced me and forbade me to speak my convictions.”26 These were for a number of reasons—
crude jokes and unfair coaching strategies—but the narrator also identifies her un-introspectable 
knowledge of her childhood abuse as a factor. In this sense, though the narrator was unable to 
introspect on her knowledge and memories, she was able to believe and act on the basis of them.  
 Thus, we can conclude that the narrator’s memories and knowledge of her abuse by her 
coach were not introspectable but were acted upon; these states were niA-conscious. I first want 
 
24 Shah, “A New Argument for Evidentialism.” 
25 One might argue that the memories are present and introspectable, but the truth is simply too difficult to accept. I 
chose not to endorse this view for two reasons. The first reason is that it that, if it were, the experience of insight that 
is later described likely would not obtain. If the truth was something acknowledged but unaccepted, then the 
experience of the “uh-oh” would instead be more akin to resignation, which lacks fidelity to the narratives. The 
second reason is that that view characterizes the narrator as believing irrationally; this, to me, is an ethically 
undesirable view to endorse. 
26 Prewitt-White, “I Was His Litmus Test.” 
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to note that I take the i/niA-consciousness distinction to furnish clearer analysis than A-
consciousness alone. The former allows us to identify how a state factors into both the narrator’s 
experience and reasoning, while the latter points only to a state’s role in reasoning. This may 
(though further research is needed27) allow us to identify ways in which trauma, more generally, 
operates within our consciousness and unconsciousness (and in-between).  
 In the above, I analyzed the narrator’s states before she heard the testimony of another 
survivor and I argued that the memories were niA-conscious. Upon hearing the testimony, 
though, the narrator undergoes a notable epistemic shift and experiences intense, idiosyncratic 
quale/qualia. I will now analyze the narrator’s states following this experience, the experience 
itself, and what this demonstrates about consciousness, insight, and trauma. 
 The narrator’s states undergo shifts conscious status upon listening to the testimony of a 
fellow survivor of childhood sexual abuse. She writes, 
Yet, when the survivor described how icky she felt when Coach held her hand and 
how he caressed the base of her wrist with his middle finger—I froze. Time stood 
still. I thought, “How do I know exactly what she is describing?” “Did he hold my 
hand, too?” “Did I put it so far out of my conscious memory to forget it?” He did 
hold my hand—tears escaped my eyelids like a runaway fugitive. My body 
remembered it; I felt as if he was touching me that very moment as the hair on my 
arms stood perked. I knew the caress she described. I could not deny… [as] she 
described his living room and him closing his front curtains, I knew it in my body. 
I listened and attempted to support her as countless summer afternoons besieged 
my memory…. I was disheartened because I was fully conscious of the reality of 
my lived truth—I was his litmus test and my body knew it first.28 
 
The first notable feature of this narrative is that the realization was sudden that she, too, had 
suffered abuse. In other words, upon hearing the testimony of another, the narrator experiences 
the phenomenon of insight pertaining to her own experiences with abuse. She describes 
 
27 A particularly illuminating project might be to interview survivors of traumatic experience and analyze how 
different states are coded under the ni/iA-consciousness paradigm to determine if any patterns exist. 
28 Prewitt-White, “I Was His Litmus Test.” 
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“freezing” and identifying that she suddenly was “besieged” by memories and realizations, 
eventually becoming “fully conscious” of her experiences. Insight, when related to problem-
solving or positive experiences, can be described as the “aha!” moment, or the moment of 
“puzzle pieces falling into place.” Unfortunately, the narrator experiences the negative version of 
insight (the “uh-oh” moment) where the object of insight is deeply unpleasant, as in the case 
here. 
 To determine what mediates the insight experience, we should turn to what the 
differences are between the initial and final situations. In the initial situation, the narrator’s 
memories are A-conscious insofar as they guide her action and operate as a premise for further 
deliberation (such as that he is unfit to coach women). But, these memories are not 
introspectable; the narrator believes the opposite of what her memories support, which is not 
rationally possible if she is capable of introspecting on them. Thus, in the initial situation, the 
narrator’s memories are niA-conscious. In the final situation, the narrator’s are again A-
conscious. The memories operate as premises for reasoning (e.g. that she was a victim of 
grooming, that she was wronged, that she was his “litmus test”) and guides her actions. Unlike 
the initial situation, however, these memories are now introspectable. The narrator can recognize, 
identify, and even voluntarily call upon memories to which she previously did not have access. 
Consequently, those memories are now iA-conscious. 
 A similar framework is found in Excerpt Three. In Excerpt Three, a woman comes to 
realize that she is approaching the anniversary of a traumatic miscarriage. She describes it as 
follows: 
I understood with a new certainty the dizziness and tingling hands that even 
WebMD would not diagnose as a fatal malady but figured as sure signs of 
anxiety. I knew why my chest had been unusually heavy in the last few days, and 
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why I’m finding it hard to breathe in crowded spaces and when I am too much 
alone. 
 
And I found the reason for the feeling of everything being too loud, too fast, too 
demanding but not wanting to sit still and silent either had an explanation. 
 
“Oh gosh,” I told her. “It’s almost May. I just realized it. It is like my body knew 
it was May before my brain did.”29 
 
There are two primary components that should be disentangled here, as I argue one is a result of 
the other. There is the P-conscious component, which relate to the narrators sensory experience 
and qualia. This is the narrator’s chest’s “heaviness” and difficulty breathing, as well as her 
experiencing the world as too loud and fast. There is also the A-conscious component, which is 
the knowledge that the anniversary is approaching. The narrator describing how she avoids 
staying still and silent—almost as if she is trying to keep herself busy and distract herself, which 
is a common and rational method of dealing with traumatic anniversaries—indicating that she is 
acting on the basis of the knowledge of the anniversary. Another potential way to read this 
narrative is that the narrator is experiencing these negative P-conscious states that are consistent 
with trauma, and that P-consciousness experiences are often intertwined with A-conscious states, 
which again suggests that there is some A-conscious knowledge driving the narrator’s 
experience. Regardless of which reading one chooses to endorse, the knowledge of the 
impending anniversary appears to be A-conscious insofar as it is guiding action and is poised to 
serve as a premise for additional reasoning (i.e. “the anniversary is impending; thus, it behooves 
me to distract myself”).  
Consistent with the previous narratives, this A-conscious state is not introspectable. The 
narrator describes suddenly understanding something she previously was not aware of; rather 
than there being any disease or simply random chance, the symptoms and experiencing she is 
 
29 Mitchell, “On Loss You Can Never Get Back and a Grief Your Body Won’t Forget.” 
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suffering is caused by the impending anniversary of her miscarriage. If this understanding is new 
and sudden, then she previously must not have been able to introspect on her knowledge of the 
anniversary and its role in her decision-making. Thus, the initial state is niA-conscious.  
 Upon talking to her friend about her experiences on the phone, the narrator observes the 
date, approaching May. Suddenly, the narrator is able to introspect on the knowledge of her 
impending anniversary and grief: this is her insight experience. The narrator experiences an 
“aha!”/“uh-oh” moment; she describes it as “suddenly making sense” and finding a “new 
certainty” regarding how her experiences and actions/dispositions have been affected 
subliminally from this knowledge and how they are being affected now. The knowledge of her 
anniversary is still A-conscious (it is still guiding her actions and is now explicitly serving as a 
premise in her reasoning), but it is now also introspectable.  
 Thus, in Excerpt Three, as in Excerpt One, the narrator begins with niA-conscious 
states which become iA-conscious. The narrator experiences insight regarding their states, 
actions, and in some cases, identity. Given that the primary difference, in both narratives, 
between the initial and final states is the introspectability of the A-conscious memories, there is 
strong reason to think that the shift from niA-consciousness to iA-consciousness underlies the 
insight experience. I will endorse this view and argue for it on the basis of how the ni/iA-
consciousness distinction affects explanations and how the relationship between explanations 
and insight experiences. 
 I argue that the shift from niA-consciousness to iA-consciousness mediates (and amounts 
to) the insight experiences displayed in Excerpt One and Excerpt Three. The insight 
experience in Excerpt One is the sudden awareness and recognition of memories of childhood 
abuse and its subsequent effects on the narrator, wherein the memories are the content of the A-
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conscious state and its effects are that which makes it A-conscious, respectively. This state, 
which was once not introspectable but nonetheless performing the roles that make it A-
conscious, suddenly becomes introspectable and accessible for the narrator to recognize. Given 
that Excerpt One describes an insight experience characterized by sudden recognition of a state 
and its function, we have reason to think that it derives from (or, perhaps, is the P-conscious 
experience of30) the change between a state that is guiding action but not introspectable (niA-
conscious) to a state that is guiding action and is suddenly introspectable (iA-conscious). Thus, I 
argue the change a state being niA-conscious to iA-conscious underwrites the insight experience 
in Excerpt One. 
 Does this obtain in Excerpt Three? The narrator suddenly comes to be aware of the fact 
that the anniversary of her miscarriage is imminent (this is the content of the state) and the way 
that that knowledge is impacting her comportment and experiences (that which makes it A-
conscious). Previously, that knowledge was not introspectable, but the narrator becomes 
suddenly able to introspect on the state and how it operates. The same paradigm in Excerpt One 
obtains in Excerpt Three. 
Altogether, in the experiences of insight described in the narratives, it seems that a state 
(the relevant belief or knowledge) shifting from niA-consciousness to iA-consciousness 
underwrites the experience of insight. In these narratives, the shift seems necessary to produce an 
insight experience, but it is not clear whether it is sufficient to do so.31 In sum, the narrators’ 
insight experiences are explicable and understandable by looking at the features of the state in 
 
30 This view would argue that insight is the P-conscious element of the niA-conscious to iA-conscious change. As P-
consciousness is the “what it is like” and emotional/experiential system, and insight has distinct emotional 
components and qualia over and above merely new accessibility of information about your states, this is perhaps a 
compelling view. Ultimately, however, the relationship between P-consciousness and insight is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
31 Future research might examine if the niA-conscious to iA-conscious shift obtains in other cases of insight. If so is 
this shift necessary and/or sufficient to engender the insight experience? 
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question, namely its status as A-conscious and introspectable, and whether there is a shift from 
niA-consciousness to iA-consciousness. 
 
  
 Kramer 27 
VII. Bodily Memory in the Narratives 
 One final question remains unaddressed: what are the narrators referring to, in all three 
excerpts, when they purport bodily memory? One option is that there is such thing as bodily 
memory as a memory-type sui generis. If this is the case, then the content of the bodily memory 
and the niA-conscious would be identical. This is somewhat peculiar, given that we generally 
only have one “copy” of a memory. Which one factors into the act of remembering? What kinds 
of memories can be duplicated?  
 The view I endorse is that bodily knowledge/memory is a way to name niA-conscious 
states. Our mental lives are heavily identified with introspection and introspectability. 
Deliberation, decision-making, remembering, reminiscing, and other acts that we take to be 
components of the human mental life are often intertwined (and perhaps even require) 
introspectability. What is it to reminisce on a memory that is not introspectable? However, I 
argue there is a conflation between the mental and the introspectable. As Rowlands, Freud, 
Block, and countless others have argued, not all that is mental is introspectable.32, 33, 34, 35, 36 
Nonetheless, our mental lives, as we experience them, are mostly characterized by 
introspectability. In fact, intuitively (without exploring the literature on consciousness), we might 
even think that consciousness is defined by introspectability. 
Consequently, when one identifies that there is a memory or state that is not 
introspectable, they relegate it to “outside the mind.” Given the intuitive (albeit heavily 
reductionist and perhaps altogether false) tripart view of mind, body, and environment, it is fairly 
 
32 Freud, “Part I. Parapraxes.” 
33 Freud, “Part III. General Theory of the Neuroses.” 
34 Freud and Breuer, Studies in Hysteria. 
35 Rowlands, Memory and the Self. 
36 Block, Flanagan, and Guzeldere, The Nature of Consciousness. 
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reasonable to ascribe these memories (which are certainly one’s own, rather than the 
environment’s) to the body. In other words, because we often lack the concept of a conscious but 
not introspectable state, when there are cases of A-conscious states that are not/were not 
introspectable, they are attributed to the body, as the lack of introspectability makes it seem 
outside the mental sphere.  
What does this mean for the narratives? For one, the narrators are remarkably specific in 
their ascription of their mental states. If we take “bodily state” to mean “a non-introspectable 
state,” then the narrators are quite correct when they purport that they had bodily states that 
guided their lives. In sum, though predicated on what I take to be a common and reasonable 
misconception, the narrators are providing a precise and rational ascription of their states that can 
be used to better understand the nature of their states, experiences, and how we ought to respond. 
Given the precision of the description and the grave content of the memories in the above 
examples, we ought to take seriously cases where people ascribe bodily memory or knowledge 
of trauma to themselves. 
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VIII. Conclusions 
 Altogether, then, I propose the following view. There is such thing as A-conscious states 
that are not introspectable, and it is possible for them to later suddenly become introspectable. In 
the above cases of insight about trauma in which “bodily memory” is asserted, the insight is 
mediated by the transition of niA-conscious states to iA-consciousness.  
Regarding cases of trauma in which one describes an insight experience and bodily 
knowledge, I argue these are a bona fide group. These narratives involve description of a niA-
conscious state that operates in ways that are similar in each case. Specifically, these narrators 
report “unconscious” memories or knowledge on which they act/acted.37, 38 These niA-conscious 
states may, or may not, become iA-conscious.39 In cases of insight, this niA-conscious to iA-
conscious transition underwrites the experience similarly. Finally, the language used to describe 
such states is in many ways unified (note that all three narratives use the language of bodily 
memory/knowledge similarly), precise, and rationalized by the way we take introspection to 
function in the naïve conception of mental life and consciousness. Altogether, this type of 
memory is a bona fide group because of similar structure (and subsequent operation) and 
content.  
This group of traumatic niA-conscious (bodily) states is meaningful, as well.40 The 
idiosyncratic nature of the states and the narrators’ experiences with them may help contribute to 
discourse on consciousness, introspection, and insight. Furthermore, the content of the states, 
namely trauma, generates ethical imperatives to take these states seriously. 
 
37 Freud and Breuer, Studies in Hysteria. 
38 Rowlands, “Rilkean Memory.” 
39 Future work might examine what engenders the switch from niA-consciousness to iA-consciousness.  
40 Not all groups of states are necessarily meaningful, even if such groups are valid. For example, “memories of a 
door” or “states I came to hold on Tuesdays” are both genuine groups, but are not particularly worthy of 
consideration. 
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In this thesis I have sought to explore and clarify the phenomenon in which people have 
traumatic memory/knowledge which they identify as bodily memory/knowledge. This 
phenomenon often coexists with the experience of insight, in which one experiences an “aha!” or 
“uh-oh” moment. I turned to consciousness as a potential clarifying factor, as consciousness and 
memory are conceptually linked and case studies, such as those by Freud and Breuer,41 suggest 
consciousness plays an important role in memory of trauma. However, the “consciousness versus 
unconsciousness” conception of consciousness was insufficient to provide clarification on the 
phenomena of interest. Consequently, I turned to Ned Block’s characterization of consciousness 
as consisting of P-consciousness and A-consciousness, though I argued this, too, failed to capture 
what I took to be a crucial feature of the narratives: the presence or absence of introspectability 
towards the relevant memory/knowledge. I refined A-consciousness into introspectable and not 
introspectable A-conscious, then demonstrated that these concepts allow for thorough 
explanation and understanding of the narratives and these phenomena. I argued that the 
narratives consist of niA-conscious states that, in some cases, become iA-conscious; this shift 
engenders the insight experience. Further, I argued that the verbiage of niA-consciousness 
(which is not immediately intuitive, that we might be acting on the basis of information upon 
which we cannot introspect) is often not accessible and thus some, not unreasonably, describe it 
as bodily memory/knowledge as it “acts” like memory/knowledge but lacks the introspectability 
that we associate with mental states. Altogether, these seemingly isolated cases of bodily 
memory/knowledge and insight experiences are, in fact, structurally similar and can help provide 
information about consciousness and insight. 
  
 
41 Freud and Breuer, Studies in Hysteria. 
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Appendix A 
 
 Below, I have listed three excerpts from narratives that that I cite in my thesis. Excerpt 1 
recounts the moment of recovering memories of childhood sexual abuse. Excerpt 2 discusses the 
aftermath of a sexual assault. Excerpt 3 discusses a traumatic miscarriage’s anniversary.  
 
 
Excerpt 1: Prewitt-White, Tanya R. “I Was His Litmus Test: An Autoethnographic Account of 
Being Groomed in Sport.” Journal of Clinical Sport Psychology 13, no. 2 (June 2019): 180–95. 
 
“I soon learned of similarities between the survivor’s experience and my own and each time she 
gave name to her experience, my body clenched. I could not help but question why he had never 
crossed the line with me. Yet, when the survivor described how icky she felt when Coach held 
her hand and how he caressed the base of her wrist with his middle finger—I froze. Time stood 
still. I thought, “How do I know exactly what she is describing?” “Did he hold my hand, too?” 
“Did I put it so far out of my conscious memory to forget it?” He did hold my hand—tears 
escaped my eyelids like a runaway fugitive. My body remembered it; I felt as if he was touching 
me that very moment as the hair on my arms stood perked. I knew the caress she described. I 
could not deny… As she described his living room and him closing his front curtains, I knew it 
in my body. I listened and attempted to support her as countless summer afternoons besieged my 
memory.” (183-184) 
-- 
“I was disheartened because I was fully conscious of the reality of my lived truth—I was his 
litmus test and my body knew it first.” (189) 
 
 
Excerpt 2: Me Too Movement. “Yellin ‘Me Too.,’” October 9, 2018. 
https://metoomvmt.org/2018/10/09/yellin-me-too/. 
 
“I hardly knew him, and hadn’t spoken three sentences to him before he did that. A few weeks 
later, I saw him at a basketball game, and he tried to joke around with me and lightly, maybe 
even kindly, put his hand on my arm. I shocked him, and myself, when I quickly pulled my arm 
away, looked him straight in the eye, and said, “Don’t you ever touch me again.” My body knew, 
way before my mind or heart did.” 
 
 
Excerpt 3: Mitchell, Colleen. “On Loss You Can Never Get Back and a Grief Your Body Won’t 
Forget.” For Every Mom (blog), September 9, 2016. https://foreverymom.com/faith/cellular-
memory-grief-colleen-mitchell/. 
 
“And I found the reason for the feeling of everything being too loud, too fast, too demanding but 
not wanting to sit still and silent either had an explanation. 
 
“Oh gosh,” I told her. “It’s almost May. I just realized it. It is like my body knew it was May 
before my brain did.”” 
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Appendix B 
 
 Above, I argued that bodily memories consist of memories that not introspectable but 
nonetheless capable of being A-conscious. I now want to address the nature of bodily memories 
as it relates to the episodic versus semantic memory distinction.  
 Each of the narratives, as I have presented them, contain niA-conscious memories that 
are episodic in nature. Is there something to bodily memories that make it such that episodic and 
only episodic memories (as opposed to semantic memories) are eligible?  
 Certainly, there are cases of insight that involve semantic memories. Consider the 
following:  
Supermarket: I am at the supermarket, and I need to buy coconut milk. Though I 
had “forgotten” the fact that I need the coconut milk, I drift over to the 
“international” aisle. I am confused as to why I went to this aisle, until suddenly: 
“Aha!” I say, “I need coconut milk.”  
 
In this case, there is an insight experience (the “aha!” moment): the realization that I need 
coconut milk. The knowledge that I need coconut milk is also A-conscious, insofar as it is 
serving as a premise for deliberation (“I need coconut milk, coconut milk is considered 
international at Harris Teeter, thus I should go to the international aisle”) and guiding my action 
(me physically walking to the international aisle). This A-conscious state was not introspectable, 
as evidenced by my confusion upon arriving in the aisle. Thus, it seems that Supermarket meets 
all the criteria necessary for a bodily memory (a niA-conscious memory). Certainly, though, it 
seems that there is something different about the experiences of Supermarket and the narratives. 
Does this mean that there is an additional criterion for a bodily memory, namely that its content 
be episodic? 
I argue that it is not the case there is an episodic requirement to be a bodily memory. 
Rather, I argue that the difference lies in the P-conscious experiences of Supermarket and the 
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narratives. In Supermarket, the P-conscious element is merely the experience of insight, the 
experience of suddenly remembering. However, in the Narratives, there are multiple P-conscious 
elements. There is, still, the P-conscious element deriving from the experience of insight. But 
there are also P-conscious elements that are related to the content of the memory itself—the P-
conscious elements that perhaps were part of the episode itself (e.g. pain, or fear) or the P-
conscious elements that derive from the realization that these episodes happened to oneself (e.g. 
in Excerpt One), to name a few. So, what separates the niA-conscious memories labeled bodily 
memories from the niA-conscious memories not labeled bodily memories might simply be the 
latter’s lack of import or impact due to its relatively minimal P-conscious features.  
Thus, there is a de facto requirement that a bodily memory be episodic, due to episodic 
memories having greater potential for P-conscious impact. However, I want to leave open the 
possibility of semantic memories that have strong P-conscious features, and thus bodily 
memories that are semantic in nature. Consider Rowlands’ presentation of how an episodic 
memory could lose the presence of self in memory and degenerate into a semantic memory of the 
same event. Could this still serve as the content for a bodily memory?  
The aforementioned form of semantic memory arose through the degeneration of an 
episodic memory. A further question might regard a purely semantic memory that had no 
episodic intermediate, and whether it might serve as the content for a bodily memory. The first 
point is to ask whether there is such thing as a traumatic memory that is exclusively semantic. It 
is difficult to answer this question, as trauma is highly subjective and personal. One potential 
thought experiment is as follows: 
Midazolam: Midazolam is a sedative that prevents one from encoding any new 
memories but does not prevent one from feeling pain. (It is for this reason it is 
also paired with a local anesthetic for minor surgeries.) One is administered this 
drug, and while under its influence, suffers some sort of violation by the 
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provider.42 Months later, this person receives a letter from a trusted source giving 
an account of what occurred in clear but unemotional terms. 
 
Certainly, this person experienced trauma. It’s not immediately clear, though, what kind of 
memory of the trauma the victim possesses. Is the memory an episodic memory of reading the 
letter? Semantic memory of the letter’s content? If the latter, is it the semantic memory that is 
doing the “work” of the trauma, or is it the mental representation of its content (the imagining of 
what occurred, as described by the letter)?  
 Altogether, there are many questions that require answering—though it is not clear to me 
how they could be investigated ethically—about what types of memory may represent traumatic 
content and do traumatic work. The answer to whether or not bodily memories may include 
semantic memories rests on these answers. However, for now, I am inclined to say bodily 
memories include memories with significant P-conscious features which include episodic 
memories while leaving the door open to semantic memories as well.  
 
42 Regrettably, this is not a hypothetical example. There are abhorrent, and tragically recent, cases of healthcare 
providers doing such horrible deeds to patients. This was the initial motivation for this thesis: what happens to 
trauma when we cannot remember? 
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